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Note
Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act: The Threat
to International Protection of U.S. Trademarks

I. Introduction
In 1959, Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba.' One of the first
things he and the new Cuban government did was expropriate and
nationalize all private property belonging to Cuban nationals and
foreign entities.2 The Archebala family, producers of Havana
Club rum, fell victim to the Cuban confiscation in 1960.'
After losing their distilleries, the Archebala family fled Cuba
and left the Cuban government to produce its own version of
Havana Club rum.4 Over the next thirteen years, the family had no
resources with which to retain the rights to the Havana Club
trademark and had to abandon the trademark in several countries.5
I Ignacio E. SAnchez, ConstitutionalProtectionof Cuban PropertyRights, 6 CUBA
IN TRANSITION 398, 398 (1996), at http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba6/
50Sanchez.fm.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commercial Regulation).
2 Id. In 1960, the claims of United States citizens alone were valued at $1.8
billion. Interfering with U.S. National Security Interests. The World Trade Organization
and The European Union Challenge to the Helms-Burton Law, Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on
International Relations, 105th Cong. 37 (1997) (statement of Ignacio Sanchez, esq.,
Partner, Kelley, Drye, and Warren).
3 Kenneth Brown, Rum War Tests U.S. Foreign Policy, THE MIAMI HERALD,
June 18, 2001, at 7B, available at www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/cuba/US(on file with the North Carolina Journal
Cuba/miamiherald06l801.html
of International Law and Commercial Regulation); Anthony Boadle, Cuba, Denied
Rum Brand, Could Make "Coke", REUTERS, June 7, 2001, available at
(on file
http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/cuba/US-Cuba/reuters060701.html
with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
4 Misha Gregory Macaw, The New Rum War. Havana Club as a Threat to the
U.S. Interest in International Trademark Harmonization, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 291, 295
(2000). The Cuban government was never able to obtain the Archebala's recipe for their
rum, which the Archebala family memorized, so it resorted to creating its own version
while continuing to market it under the Havana Club name. Id
5 Id.; see Press Release, The European Union, Geneva Confirms U.S. Law
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In 1973, the family legally abandoned its rights to the trademark in
the United States.6 Three years later, Cubaexport, the Cuban
government-owned business that had been marketing the rum for
the past
few years, registered the Havana Club trademark as its
7
own.

In 1994, Cubaexport entered into a joint venture with French
wine distributor Pernod Ricard and assigned its rights to the
Havana Club trademark to Havana Rum and Liquors, S.A., a
company formed to market and distribute the rum.8 Later in 1994,
Havana Rum and Liquors, S.A. assigned the Havana Club
trademark to Havana Club Holding, S.A. 9 Havana Club rum,
however, still could not be sold in the United States because of the
Cuban embargo." ° Bacardi ® decided to take advantage of the
popularity of the Havana Club name and market the rum in
America."
Starting in 1995, Bacardi ® began negotiations with the
Archebala family to buy the rights, if any, they owned in the
Havana Club trademark. 2
Although the formal agreement
between Bacardi® and the Archebala family was not reached until
Violates WTO Intellectual Property Rules in "Havana Club" Dispute (Aug. 6, 2001), at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/miti/dispute/hc.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation) [hereinafter The European
Union].
6 The European Union, supra note 5.
Macaw, supra note 4, at 295.
8 Id. at 295-96. The venture ended up being quite successful, though the rum
could not be sold in the United States because of the Cuban embargo. Id. Between 1994
and 1998, the company sold more than 38 million bottles of Havana Club rum. Id.
7

9 Id.
10 Macaw, supra note 4, at 295-96. Though the United States restricts American
travel to Cuba, it allows Cuban Americans and journalists to travel to Cuba. Victoria
Hallett, A Critical Look at the Cuba Crackdown, ARTHUR FROMMER'S BUDGET TRAVEL
DAILY NEWSLETTER (Newsweek Budget Travel, Inc., New York, N.Y.), July 26, 2001, at
http://www.ciponline.org/cuba/newsarchives/july200l/Frommers072601 hallett.htm (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
In addition, other Americans who want to visit the country have been able to by going
through Canada or Mexico. Id. Despite the Cuban embargo, American tourists are
allowed to bring up to $100 of Cuban goods back to the United States. Macaw, supra
note 4, at 296. Havana Club rum was one of the most frequently retained items. Id.
I See Macaw, supra note 4, at 296.
12 Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1091
(S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 203 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 918 (2000).
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1997, Bacardi® immediately
began distributing rum under the
13
Havana Club name.
With Bacardi® and Pernod Ricard both claiming the rights to
the Havana Club trademark, the dispute ended up in U.S. federal
court in March 1997.14 In the midst of the lawsuit, 5 Congress
passed Section 211 of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations. Act (Section 21 1).16 The court
relied upon Section 211 in ruling that Pernod Ricard could
not
7
assert its trademark infringement claims in the U.S. courtS.1
After the Havana Club case, the European Union (EU) filed a
complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO), alleging
that Section 211 violates the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)." In Part II, this Note reviews the
relevant provisions of TRIPS that formed the basis of the EU's
complaint.' 9 Part III examines Section 211 and the decision of the
WTO Appellate Body.2 ° Part IV analyzes the potential
consequences of the WTO decision and continued enforcement of
Section 211.21 Finally, in Part V, this Note concludes that the
possible consequences of the future application and enforcement

13 Macaw, supra note 4, at 296.
14 Id.

15 Havana Club Holding, S.A., 62 F. Supp. 2d at 1085, aff'd, 203 F.3d at 116, cert.
denied, 531 U.S. at 918.
16 Macaw, supra note 4, at 304; The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1999).
Section 211 limits the ability of Cuban nationals and their successors-in-interest to
register or enforce trademarks that were confiscated by the Cuban government unless the
original owner gives consent. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. Many
opponents of Section 211 allege that it was put on the books at the behest of Bacardi® to
ensure that it would not lose the lawsuit. See Boadle, supra note 3; Brown, supra note 3;
Anya K. Landau & Wayne S. Smith, American Trademarks Threatened: Conferees Call
for Repeal of Section 211 Aimed at Cuba, INT'L POL'" REP., Sept. 2001, at 3.
17 Macaw, supra note 4, at 307.
18 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS].
19 See infra notes 23-53 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 54-140 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 141-184 and accompanying text.
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of Section 211 outweigh any benefits that flow from the Section.22
II. TRIPS
As intellectual property became increasingly valuable in
international trade,23 the need for predictability and stability in the
protection of intellectual property rights became clear.24 The trend
toward globalization meant that countries could no longer rely on
domestic protection of intellectual property rights to meet the
goals of protection-to ensure fair competition and to protect
consumers. TRIPS was established as a means of harmonizing
international protection of intellectual property rights including
trademarks, copyrights, industrial designs, patents, and
undisclosed information such as trade secrets.26
Two previous treaties, the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property (Paris Convention)2 7 and the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(Berne Convention),28 were deemed incomprehensive and
inadequate.29 TRIPS solved the problem by incorporating the
22 See infra notes 185-193 and accompanying text.
23 In the early 1990s, leading up to the establishment of TRIPS, intellectual
property was becoming increasingly important to international trade. Jeffrey E. Garten,
American Trade Law in a Changing World Economy, 29 INT'L LAW. 15, 30 (1995). For
example, in 1991, the Register of Copyrights, Ralph Oman, estimated that at least
twenty-five percent of United States exports encompassed intellectual property. Id.
24 WORLD TRADE ORG., TRADING INTO THE FUTURE 25 (2d ed. rev. 1999), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload-e/tif.pdf (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last
revised in the Stockholm Act of 1967, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305
[hereinafter Paris Convention].
28 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as last revised at Brussels, June 26, 1948, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, 1161
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
29 WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 24, at 26. The Paris and Berne Conventions are
seen as inadequate for two main reasons. First, the two agreements fail to provide
comprehensive subject matter coverage. The lack of protection for trade secrets is one
example of how the agreements are lacking adequate subject matter coverage. Second,
neither agreement provides for adequate enforcement of the covered intellectual property
rights. The agreements impose minimum standards of protection for the member
countries but do not provide for meaningful ways to challenge countries that ignore those
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substantive obligations imposed by the Paris and Berne
Conventions and adding new standards to fill the gaps.3" TRIPS is
"to date the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on
intellectual property."'"
As a general matter, TRIPS lays out the minimum standards of
intellectual property rights protection that each WTO member
shall provide, the procedures and remedies that must be available
for rights holders, and a provision requiring that disputes between
WTO members with respect to their obligations under TRIPS be
governed by the WTO's dispute settlement procedures.32 It also
requires national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment.33
National treatment requires that imported goods and services and
those produced locally be treated equally.34 Similarly, the mostfavored-nation principle requires member countries to treat their
trading partners equally.35
In its complaint filed with the WTO, the EU alleged that
Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act was inconsistent
with several obligations imposed by TRIPS, when read with
certain provisions of the Paris Convention that are incorporated
into TRIPS.36 Specifically, the EU alleged that Section 211
violated Article 2.1 of TRIPS as read with Article 6quinquies of
the Paris Convention; Articles 15, 16, and 42 of TRIPS; Article
3.1 of TRIPS as read with Article 2(1) of the Paris Convention;
obligations. Marshall A. Leaffer, ProtectingUnited States IntellectualPropertyAbroad.Toward a New Multilateralism,76 IOWA L. REv. 273, 293-94 (1991).
30 WORLD TRADE ORG., TRIPS: A More Detailed Overview of the TRIPS
Agreement, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips e/intel2_e.htm (last visited
Aug. 31, 2002) [hereinafter TRIPS Overview] (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 24, at 26.

34 See id
35 Id.

36 World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report: United States-Section 211
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 1 [hereinafter WTO Report], at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/176abre.pdf (Jan. 2, 2002) (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation). Omitted
from the following discussion is the allegation with respect to Article 8 of the Paris
Convention as it merely established that trade names are protected by TRIPS, which
neither party disputed. Id.at 90-101.
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and Article 4 of TRIPS.37 The requirements imposed by each of
these sections are as follows:
1. Article 2.1 of TRIPS andArticle 6quinquies of the Paris
Convention
Article 2.1 of TRIPS incorporates by reference specific
provisions of the Paris Convention including Article 6quinquies of
the Paris Convention.38 Combined, the two articles provide one of
the minimum standards of protection that all member countries
must allow the citizens of other member countries.39 Specifically,
the articles require that member countries protect the trademark of
a foreign national of another member country who has duly
registered that trademark in his or her country of origin.4"
2. Article 15 of TRIPS
Article 15.1 of TRIPS defines what subject matter is capable
of being a registered trademark. 4 ' It also requires that subject
matter qualifying under this section be eligible for registration in
member countries.42 Article 15.2 goes on to note that 15.1 does
not prevent members from denying registration for reasons other
than the eligibility of the trademark, so long as the reasons for
denial of registration do not violate other obligations imposed by
the Paris Convention.43
3. Article 16 of TRIPS
Article 16 sets minimum levels of protection against trademark
infringement that members must guarantee to owners of registered

37

Id. at 6.

38 Id. at 36.

39 See TRIPS Overview, supra note 30.
40 Id. at 36
41 WTO Report, supra note 36, at 45-46.
42 Id.

43 Id. at 46-47. Article 6quinquies of the Paris Convention states that members
have the right to determine the conditions for registering trademarks in their domestic
legislation. Paris Convention, supra note 27, at 1639. But, this discretion is not
absolute. The Article goes on to specify certain grounds on which registration cannot be
denied. Id. For example, members may not deny registration because the applicant has
not filed for registration or renewal in his country of origin. See id.
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trademarks.44 Specifically, member countries must give the owner
of a trademark the exclusive right to prevent others from using his
or her trademark.45
4. Article 42 of TRIPS
Article 42 addresses enforcement of trademark rights in
judicial proceedings.46 It requires that member countries grant all
holders of trademark rights access to judicial procedures whereby
they can substantiate and enforce their rights.47 The judicial
proceedings must entail an adequate opportunity for the parties to
to present all evidence needed to substantiate
a trademark 4dispute
8
claims.
their
5. Article 3.1 of TRIPS andArticle 2(1) of the Paris
Convention
Article 3.1 of TRIPS and Article 2(1) of the Paris Convention,
which was incorporated by Article 2.1 of TRIPS, discuss
members' obligations with respect to national treatment. 49 The
national. treatment principle prohibits members from favoring their
own nationals over those of another member in the protection of
trademark rights, including, the accessibility, obtainment,
substance, and enforcement of such rights."
6. Article 4 of TRIPS
Article 4 requires most-favored-nation treatment.5' A member
cannot favor one nation over another in the protection of
Like- the national treatment
intellectual property rights.5 2
requirement, the most-favored-nation requirement encompasses
the accessibility, obtainment, substance, and enforcement of
44 Id. at 54.
45 Id.
46 See id. at 59.

47 WTO Report, supra note 36, at 62.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 67-68.
50 Id.
51 See WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 24, at 26 (defining most-favored-nation

status).
52 WTO Report, supra note 36 at 85-86.
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intellectual property rights. 3
III. Section 211 and the Decision of the WTO Appellate Body
A. Section 211
The effect of Section 211 is to prohibit the registration,
renewal, or recognition of businesses' trademarks that were
confiscated by the Cuban government without the consent of the
original owner of the trademark. 4 In addition, those Cuban
nationals or successors-in-interest to Cuban nationals who are
subject to Section 211 are denied access to U.S. courts in the event
that they want to contest trademark rights."
Section 211 reads as follows:
(a)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no
transaction or payment shall be authorized or approved pursuant
to section 515.527 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, as in
effect on September 9, 1998, with respect to a mark, trade name,
or commercial name that is the same as or substantially similar
to a mark, trade name, or commercial name that was used in
connection with a business or assets that were confiscated unless
the original owner of the mark, trade name, or commercial
name, or the bona fide successor-in-interest has expressly
consented.
(2) No U.S. court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise validate
any assertion of rights by a designated national based on
common law rights or registration obtained under such section
515.527 of such a confiscated mark, trade name, or commercial
name.
(b) No U.S. court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise validate
any assertion of treaty rights by a designated national or its
successor-in-interest under sections 44 (b) or (e) of the
Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1126 (b) or (e)) for a mark,
trade name, or commercial name that is the same as or
substantially similar to a mark, trade name, or commercial name
that was used in connection with a business or assets that were
confiscated unless the original owner of such mark, trade name,
or commercial name, or the bona fide successor-in-interest has
53

Id.

54

Landau & Smith, supra note 16, at 4.

55

Id.
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expressly consented.
(c) The Secretary of the Treasury shall promulgate such rules
and regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of
this section.
(d) In this section:
(1) The term "designated national" has the meaning given such
term in section 515.305 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations,
as in effect on September 9, 1998, and includes a national of any
foreign country who is a successor-in-interest to a designated
national.
(2) The term "confiscated" has the meaning given such term in
section 515.336 of title 31, Code of Federal Regulations, as in
effect on September 9, 1998.56

There are two primary policy considerations behind Section
211. 57 The first is that Section 211 promotes the interests of the
Cuban embargo.58 The embargo resulted primarily from three
aspects of the United States's relationship with Cuba. 59 The first
aggravating factor was Castro's abandonment of democracy and
establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship.6"
Second, Cuba
developed political, economic, and military ties to the Soviet
Union, which entailed Cuban reliance on Soviet trade policy and
foreign aid, and led to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.61 The third
factor was the confiscation of American property and Castro's
subsequent refusal to satisfy the claims of Americans, despite
satisfaction of the claims of other countries.62 The United States's
response was to impose a comprehensive economic embargo
against Cuba in 1962, which was implemented by the 1963 Cuban

56 The Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 211, 112 Stat. 2681-88 (1998). A "designated national"
refers to "Cuba and any national thereof." 31 C.F.R. § 515.305 (1998). "Confiscated"
refers to property expropriated and nationalized without compensation during the Castro
regime. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.336 (2001).
57 Macaw, supra note 4, at 331.
58 Id.

59 Lucien J. Dhooge, Fiddling with Fidel: An Analysis of the Cuban Liberty and
DemocraticSolidarity Act of 1996, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 575, 581 (1997).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 582.

62 Id.
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Assets Control Regulations.63 With few exceptions, the embargo
blocks importation of Cuban products, technology, or services and
exportation to Cuba of American products, technology, or
services.64
The policy goals of the Cuban embargo are "to limit the funds
which Cuba may use to promote activities harmful to the United
States, to use blocked funds as leverage in negotiations with the
Cuban government, and to retain control over blocked funds for
possible use in settling American claims" against Cuba for the
illegal expropriation of American property.65 Section 211 fosters
these goals by denying the Cuban government revenue generated
by using trademarks associated with property it illegally
confiscated in U.S. markets.66
The second policy consideration behind Section 211 is to
discourage expropriation of private property without just
compensation.67 The international community generally agrees
that a country may expropriate the private property of foreign
nationals located within that country, but it may only do so after
justly compensating the property owner.68 Since Section 211
targets trademarks that are used in connection with private
property that has been illegally expropriated, the law will
hopefully discourage other countries from confiscating property
without compensating the owner.6 9
B. Appellate Body Decision
Both the EU and the United States appealed a panel report
holding that Section 211 was not inconsistent with any of the
articles of TRIPS as alleged by the EU7 ° with the exception of

63

Id. at 583-85.

64

Dhooge, supra note 59, at 585.
Macaw, supra note 4, at 331.

65

66 Id

Id. at 332.
68 Id. at 331-32 (citing Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative Remedies in a
Negotiated Settlement of the US Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against Cuba, 17 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 659, 664 (1996)).
69 See id. at 332.
70 See supra text accompanying notes 38-45, 49-53.
67
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Article 42. 7" The Appellate Body reversed the Panel's holding in
three respects. It held that Section 211 was not inconsistent with
Article 4272 but that it was inconsistent with Article 3.1 of TRIPS
and Article 2(1) of the Paris Convention,73 the national treatment
provisions, and with Article 4 of TRIPS, 74 the most-favored-nation
In all other respects, Section 211 was deemed
provision.
consistent with the obligations imposed by TRIPS. 75 The
arguments of the United States and the EU and the rationale of the
WTO Appellate Board, with respect to the sections allegedly
violated by Section 211, were as follows:
and Article 6quinquies of the
1. Article 2.1 of TRIPS
76
Paris Convention
The EU argued that Section 211 violates Article 6quinquies of
the Paris Convention and, therefore, Article 2.1 of TRIPS because
it prohibits certain trademarks that are duly registered in the
country of origin from being registered in the United States "as
is." 77 According to the EU, the "as is" language applies to more
than just the form of the trademark-it also applies to substantive
trademark law.78 In other words, if a trademark satisfies the
conditions for registration in the applicant's country of origin, with
respect to both the form of the trademark and the substantive
conditions such as ownership, then it must be accepted for
registration in another member country.7 9
The United States disagreed with the EU's argument,
contending that these Articles only require that a member cannot
refuse registration of a trademark merely because the form of the
trademark is not in compliance with that country's domestic law.8 °
Moreover, the United States claimed that if the trademark
71 See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
72 See infra text accompanying notes 109-113.
73 See infra text accompanying notes 114-134.
74 See infra text accompanying notes 135-140.
75 See infra text accompanying notes 76-110.
76 See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
77 WTO Report, supra note 36, at 37.
78 Id.
79 Id.

80 Id. at 37-38.
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complied with the form accepted in the applicant's country of
origin, the form must be permissible in the member country in
which the applicant is seeking registration.8'
The Appellate Body agreed with the United States. It held that
the phrase "as is" indicates that the requirement to register a
trademark that has been duly registered in the country of origin
only applies to the form of the trademark.82 It is not a flat
requirement that any trademark registered in a member country
must be accepted for registration in another member country. In
support of its rationale, the Appellate Body pointed out that
Article 6(1) of the Paris Convention reserves to its members the
right to determine the conditions for the registration of trademarks
in their domestic legislation.84 The Appellate Body further noted
that if Article 6quinquies were read as broadly as the EU would
prefer, the provision would have no effect as members would have
virtually no legislative discretion to determine those conditions.85
Thus, Section 211 is consistent with Article 2.1 of TRIPS and
Article 6quinquies, since it denies registration of certain
trademarks because of issues relating to ownership, rather than
form.86

2. Article 15 of TRIPS"7
The EU argued that Section 211 violates Article 15.1 of
TRIPS. According to the EU, Section 211 allows WTO members
to deny registration to trademarks that are eligible for registration
under Article 15.1.88 The United States, however, argued that the
Article merely sets out conditions of distinctiveness and defines
what trademarks are eligible for protection.89 Contrary to the EU's
argument, Article 15.1 does not require that any trademark eligible

81

Id.

82

See WTO Report, supra note 36, at 40-43.

83 See id. at 40-41.
84

See supranote 43.

85
86

WTO Report, supra note 36, at 41.
Id. at 44.

87

Id. at 44-46; see supra text accompanying notes 42-43.

88

WTO Report, supra note 36, at 44.

89

Id. at 45.

SECTION 211 OF THE OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS ACT

2002]

233

for protection be accepted.9" Rather, it only requires that members
not refuse registration on the ground that the trademark is not of a
distinctive quality when the conditions of distinctiveness set out in
the Article are met.9 Member countries may, as expressed in the
Article,92 deny registration on other grounds. 93
Again, the Appellate Body held in favor of the United States,
ruling that Article 15.1 defines the characteristics that qualify a
trademark for protection and that a trademark that is eligible for
protection is not necessarily entitled to it.94 The Appellate Body's
rationale is similar to their holding with respect to Article 2.1 of
TRIPS in conjunction with Article 6quinquies of the Paris
Convention. Members are granted discretion to set their own
conditions for registering trademarks under their domestic laws
per Article 6(1) of the Paris Convention.95 If Article 15.1 is read
as requiring the registration of all trademarks that qualify for
registration, Article 6(1) would be nullified.96 Instead, the
Appellate Body read Article 15.1 as merely limiting the discretion
granted to members under Article 6(1) as it pertains to the
distinctiveness of trademarks.97 Section 211 does not concern the
issues of distinctiveness that Article 15.1 regulates, so it is not
inconsistent with the Article.98

90 Id. at 46.
91 Id.
92 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.

93 WTO Report, supra note 36, at 45-46.
94 Id. at 46.
95 See supra note 43.
96

WTO Report, supra note 36, at 48.

97 Id.

98 The EU also argued that Section 211 could not be justified by the provision in
Article 15.2 allowing members to refuse registration on "other grounds," because, "only
those exceptions which are expressly foreseen in the Paris Convention are permissible."
Id. at 49-50. After initially noting that their holding with respect to Article 15.1 was
dispositive of the EU's Article 15 challenge, the Appellate Body refuted this argument.
The Appellate Body refuted the EU's argument because the Article allows members to
refuse registration on "other grounds" so long as they do not "derogate" from the Paris
Convention. Since "derogate" means "to detract from" or "to take away from," the EU's
argument does not hold true. The argument fails because a denial based on "other
grounds" would only derogate from the Paris Convention if it were inconsistent with a
specific provision of that agreement. Id. at 49-52.
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3. Article 16 of TRIPS99
The EU contended that Section 211 violates Article 16 of
TRIPS because Section 211 denies the minimum levels of
protection that Article 16.1 explicitly requires members to
guarantee to trademark owners."0 The United States responded
that Section 211 only denies protection to those who are not
trademark owners under U.S. law, as registration in another
country does not confer trademark ownership.'
The Appellate Body agreed with the United States. They
pointed out that "[a]lthough Article 16.1 grants these exclusive
rights to trademark owners, it does not define who the 'owner'
is.' 1 2 Further, nowhere in TRIPS or the Paris Convention is there
any provision requiring how ownership is to be defined.1 3 This
left the Appellate Body to conclude that the definition of
ownership is within the discretion of the individual members. 0 4
The Appellate Body's conclusion that the individual members
can formulate their own definitions of trademark ownership
validates U.S. trademark law. U.S. trademark law defines
ownership on the basis of use, rather than on the basis of
registration.0 5 Since Article 16 does not define trademark
ownership, the United States can maintain, as it does in Section
211, that Cuban nationals or successors-in-interest of Cuban
nationals who own property by virtue of the Cuban confiscation
are not the owners of the trademarks associated with that
property.'0 6 It follows that, as Article 16.1 rights are granted only
to trademark owners, Cuban nationals or their successors-ininterest are not entitled to those exclusive rights.0 7 Accordingly,

99 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
100 WTO Report, supra note 36, at 52.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 54.
103 Id. at 55.
104 Id.

105 Id.at 57. it should be noted that in the United States registration of a trademark
creates a presumption of ownership. But, Section 211, if applicable, rebuts that
presumption. Id.at 57-58.
106 WTO Report, supra note 36, at 57-58.
107 See id.
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Section 211 is not inconsistent with Article 16 of TRIPS.' 0 8
4. Article 42 of TRIPS10 9
The EU asserted that Section 211 denies trademark owners fair
and equitable access to U.S. courts because it requires courts to
resolve the question of ownership as a threshold to resolving the
substantive claims of those who seek the protection of
trademarks."' The United States objected to this argument on the
ground that it is permissible for a country to legislate that a court
evaluate certain claims before and to the exclusion of others."'
The Appellate Body agreed with the United States, concluding
that Article 42 does not require a member to legislate that its
courts must evaluate every substantive issue in a case before
ruling." 2 It is not a violation of Article 42 when Section 211
makes it impossible for a court to rule in favor of a party after
establishing that he or she does not own the trademark at issue." 3
5. Article 3.1 of TRIPS andArticle 2(1) of the Paris
Convention""'
The EU claimed that Section 211 violates the national
treatment obligations of Article 3.1 of TRIPS and the incorporated
Article 2(1) of the Paris Convention. 15 The Appellate Body
108 Id. at 58.

109 WTO Report, supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
110 WTO Report, supra note 36, at 65. The EU agreed with the United States that
those affected by Section 211 initially have adequate access to U.S. courts, since, on the
face of Section 211, those affected have the right to substantiate their claims of
ownership. Id. It is only after a court finds that ownership has not been established that
the court will reject whatever substantive claim the party may have raised. Id. The EU's
objection to this process is that Section 211 requires the courts to abstain from ruling on
any of the other substantive claims. Id. For example, in a trademark infringement suit, if
the court finds that the plaintiff has not established ownership of the trademark, it is
precluded from ruling on whether or not the trademark has actually been infringed. See
id.
''

Ild.

112 Id.

113 Id. The Appellate Body noted that its ruling with respect to Article 42 pertains
only to Section 211 on its face, rather than its application, since the EU did not challenge
Section 211 in its application. Id. at 66-67.
114 See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
115 WTO Report, supra note 36, at 67.
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agreed with the EU's argument and concluded that the national
treatment obligation was not complied with in the cases of
successor-in-interest and original owners.116
a) Successors-in-interest
Section 211 applies to Cuban nationals or foreign nationals
that are successors-in-interest to a Cuban national.' 17 It makes no
mention of U.S. nationalsthat are successors-in-interest to Cuban
nationals. 18 The United States defended this omission by pointing
out that U.S. nationals are prohibited from becoming successorsin-interest in property that was confiscated by the Cuban
government." 9 Although the Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC)12 has the discretion to issue a special license allowing a
U.S. national to become a successor-in-interest to confiscated
assets, it has never done so, and there is no reason to believe it
ever will. 12' Further, the United States argued that it would be
inappropriate to assume that a member would act in a manner that
is inconsistent with its obligations under TRIPS, even if it has the
discretion to do SO. 12 2 This argument is based on a prior panel
report, establishing that where a WTO member has discretionary
authority, it cannot be assumed that the government will act in
violation of its international obligations.2 3 Although the EU did
not deny any of the United States's arguments, it contended that
the United States's arguments did not cure the discrimination in
Section 21 1.124 The Appellate Body agreed.
On its face, Section 211 imposes an "extra hurdle" on foreign
116

Id. at 85.

117

See Landau & Smith, supra note 16, at 4.

118

See id.

119 WTO Report, supra note 36, at 71.
120 In any instance where a buyer is acquiring a United States trademark registered
by a Cuban national, the transaction must be approved by OFAC. This is so regardless
of the nationality of the buyer or whether or not the trademark is associated with
confiscated assets. Id.at 14.
121 Id. at 71.
122

Id.

See United States-MeasuresAffecting the Importation,Internal Sale and Use of
Tobacco, DS44/R (Aug. 12, 1994) (panel report adopted on Oct. 4, 1994), available at
1994 WL 910938 (G.A.T.T).
124 WTO Report, supra note 36, at 73.
123
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successors-in-interest. 125 All transactions involving trademarks in
which a Cuban national has an interest must be approved by
OFAC, regardless of whether the buyer is a foreign or U.S.
national. 126 In addition, Section 211 imposes a second hurdle for
foreign nationals in that their rights will not be recognized by U.S.
courts without consent of the original owner. 127 This obligation is
not imposed on U.S. nationals.128 Not only is the existence of the
second hurdle present on the face of Section 211, it also exists
without having to assume any action on the part of OFAC.'29
b) Originalowners
The Appellate Body agreed with a hypothetical situation posed
by the EU to illustrate how Section 211 violates national treatment
obligations with respect to original owners. 3 ° The situation is that
of two entities-one Cuban and one American-that are the
original owners of U.S. trademarks. Each entity acquired the
trademarks before the Cuban confiscation,' and the trademarks
happen to be the same or substantially similar to other trademarks
confiscated by Cuba.3 2 The owners of the U.S. trademarks,
however, are not the original owners of the Cuban trademarks.'
In this scenario, Section 211 would apply to the Cuban national
and not the American national, and thus, it violates national
treatment. 3
125 Id. at 75.
126 See supra note 120.
127 WTO Report, supra note 36, at 75-76.
128 Id. at 75-76.
129 Id. at 76.
130 Id. at 78-79.
131 Id.

132 WTO Report, supra note 36, at 78-79.
133 Id. at 78-79. The United States argued that Section 211 does not apply to
original owners because original owners always consent to the use of their own
trademarks. Id. at 80. The United States, however, fails to recognize this type of
situation, where a U.S. trademark and a Cuban trademark are substantially similar, but
have different original owners. Id.
134 Id. at 79. The United States attempted to show that the Cuban national would
not be at a disadvantage because if he were a United States resident, he would
automatically be an "unblocked national," which means that he would have the same
status as United States nationals. Id. at 81-82. The Appellate Body agreed with this
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6. Article 4 of TRIPS"'
The Appellate Body referred to the same hypothetical used to
analyze the effect of Section 211 on national treatment with one
difference. 136 Instead of one of the original owners being a U.S.
national, the original owner is a foreign national of a country other
than Cuba.'3 7 Like the American original owner, the non-Cuban
foreign national would be holding a trademark that is the same or
substantially similar to one that was confiscated by Cuba and
would fall under Section 211. Like the American original owner,
however, Section 211 does not apply to the non-Cuban foreign
national, who is an original owner. 138 Rather, Section 211 only
applies to non-Cuban foreign nationals when they are successorsin-interest to Cuban nationals.'
On its face, therefore, Section
211 violates most-favored-nation treatment because it treats nonCuban foreign nationals who are original owners differently than it
treats Cuban nationals who are original owners. 4 °
IV. Implications
The Appellate Body decision is final.' 4 ' There will be no more
appeals.' 42 Thus, if the United States amends Section 211 to
conform to national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment
obligations, Cuban nationals and their successors-in-interest will
continue to be restricted in the registration and enforcement of
trademarks- in the United States.'43 The consequences could be
argument but pointed out that if the Cuban national was not a resident of the United
States, he would have to apply to be unblocked, which would be another example of an
"extra hurdle," thereby violating national treatment. Id. at 82-83.
135 See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
136 See supra text accompanying notes 130-132.
137 WTO Report, supra note 36, at 88.
138

Id.

139 Id.

140

Id.

141 See WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 24, at 40.
142

Id.

143Putting Section 211 into conformity will not be difficult for the United States
and will not change the effect of the Section. Congress merely needs to modify the
language of the statute so that nationals of every member, original owners, and
successors-in-interest alike, are covered. Thus, the odds are good that Section 211 will
persevere.
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wide-ranging, from harm to consumers worldwide, to damaging
to benefiting
the United States's economy and political legitimacy,
44
the Cuban economy and the Castro regime.
A. The Cuban Response
In response to Section 211, Cuban President Fidel Castro
145
threatened the non-recognition of U.S. trademarks in Cuba.
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,146 he has an
argument that he is authorized to do so, because when a country
defaults on its treaty obligations to another country, that country
has a right of retaliation. 47 Thus, to the extent that Section 211 is
seen as a violation of America's obligation to respect Cuba's
trademark rights, Cuba can respond by refusing to respect U.S.
trademarks.148 If Cuba responds this way and begins marketing
products under U.S. trademarks, that alone could have drastic
the U.S. economy, while strengthening
effects on consumers and
49
Cuba.1
on
hold
Castro's
1. Harm to Consumers
One of the motivations for the protection of trademarks is
A trademark allows consumers to
consumer protection. 50
purchase goods with assurances of quality and safety, since
consumers can associate a trademark with a reputable
manufacturer.' 5 ' When trademarks are not. respected, there are
potential risks of harm to consumers, who cannot tell the
difference between the counterfeit version and the real thing.'52
The risk of harm, becomes even more probable when the
144 Landau & Smith, supra note 16, at 4.
145 Id. at 5. See Boadle, supra note 3.

146 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
147 Landau & Smith, supra note 16, at 5.
148 Id.

149 See The Anti-Counterfeiting Group, General Information, at http://www.acg.com/guestframes04.html (last updated Feb. 25, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
150 See id.
151 See id.
152 See id.
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counterfeit goods are of inferior quality.153 There are numerous
examples of consumers being harmed by counterfeit goods. One
glaring example is counterfeit prescription and over-the-counter
drugs.'54 In 1998, a counterfeit version of the drug Androcur,
which is used to treat prostate cancer, caused the deaths of at least
three Brazilians.'55 In addition, counterfeit eye drops found in
Nigeria were made from contaminated water
and could have
15 6
them.
used
who
consumers
in
blindness
caused
Counterfeit drugs may pose the most obvious risks to
consumers, as harmful effects are easily apparent.' 57 There is,
however, no shortage of risk associated with other counterfeit
products such as alcohol,' 58 construction materials,' 59 and
components for cars, airplanes, and even space shuttles, when the
products are of inferior quality and marketed under a well-known
trademark. 160 Some of the well-known trademarks at risk in Cuba
153 See id.
154 See Naomi Aoki, A Dose of Unreality as More Counterfeit Drugs Enter U.S.
Market, Officials Say PatientsFace Serious Risk, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 26, 2001, at El.

155 Id.
156

The Anti-Counterfeiting Group, supra note 149.

157 See Aoki, supra note 154.
158 Twenty-two Russians died in 1997 after drinking counterfeit vodka.
Press
Release, The Anti-Counterfeiting Group, Summer Holidaymakers Are Warned of the
Dangers of Fake Products From Perfume and Spirits to Aircraft Parts (July 6, 2001),
available at http://www.a-cg.com (on file with the North Carolina Journal of
International Law and Commercial Regulation).
159 Counterfeit hand tools have been found to break into razor sharp fragments, and
counterfeit nuts and bolts used in the construction of a building later caused parts of that
building to collapse during an earthquake. The Anti-Counterfeiting Group, supra note
149.
160 Counterfeit brake pads can take up to ten times as long to stop a vehicle. The
Anti-Counterfeiting Group, supra note 149. In 1991, a General Motors investigation
revealed that a mother and her child were killed when the brakes, counterfeits made of
wood chips, failed in their car. Frank Viviano & John Eckhouse, The New Era of
Pirates: Worldwide Trade in Fake Goods, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Feb. 11, 1991, at Al.
Counterfeit bolts caused the 1989 crash of a Norwegian airplane, killing all 55 people on
board. Don Phillips, Bogus Aircrafi PartsThreat Debated: DOT Inspector General and
FAA Ojficials Disagree on Potentialfor Sqfety Problem, WASH. POST, May 25, 1995, at
B12. The explosion of the space shuttle Challenger was reportedly caused by counterfeit
transistors. BANKOLE SODIPO, PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING: GATT, TRIPS, AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 122 n. 5 (Int'l Econ. Dev. Law, Series No. 5, 1997) (referencing
Unfair Foreign Practice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
of the House Comm. on Commerce, 98th Cong. 38-41 (1984)).
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include Coca-Cola®, Aunt Jemima®, Huggies®, Weight
Watchers®, Kool-Aid®, Reebok®, Nike®, and United Airlines®.161
These are all names that consumers recognize and rely on as safe.
The potential harm that could come from counterfeit versions of
these products would be inconceivable.
One opponent of Section 211 points to the Havana Club
decision as illustrative of how the Section undermines the purpose
of trademarks with respect to consumer protection. 6 2 Because of
Section 211, the Havana Club trademark has different meanings
depending on whether you are inside or outside of the United
States.'63 In the United States, Havana Club refers to the rum
made by Bacardi®. 64 Outside the United States, Havana Club is
the rum made by Havana Club Holding, S.A.165 The unsuspecting
consumer may think he is buying one, when he is really buying the
other. 6 6
2. Harm to the U. S. Economy
The importance of global markets to the U.S. economy is.
undoubtedly the main reason the United States has been so
aggressive in pushing for international intellectual property
protection. 6 7
Indeed, the need for international intellectual
property protection becomes evident after learning how much
money the United States loses every year because of a lack of
adequate protection. 68 Many of America's most well known
businesses obtain two-thirds or more of their sales from overseas
markets including Coca-Cola®, Colgate-Palmolive ® , Dow
Chemical®, Exxon", McDonald's®, and Xerox®.169

161 See Boadle, supra note 3.
162 Macaw, supra note 4, at 329.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165

Id.

166 Id.

167 See Macaw, supra note 4, at 323.
168 The United States loses billions of dollars a year because of the lack of
international intellectual property protection. Id.
169 Murray Weidenbaum, All the World's A Stage: Business Has a StarringRole in
the Increasingly Global Economy, and the United States is the Lead Actor Despite its

Weaknesses, MGMT. REv., Oct. 1999, at 42, 47.
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If Castro follows through on his threat to stop recognizing the
trademarks of American businesses and begins marketing products
under these trademarked names, U.S. businesses might lose a
portion of their sales to those marketing counterfeit products.17 °
Further, the effect that counterfeit products have on consumer
protection would no doubt result in a loss of goodwill 7 ' for these
companies. 17 2 When a company loses its goodwill and reputation,
consumers will begin buying products from other companies. The
combination of these two factors-loss of sales and goodwillinevitably leads to loss of profits. A substantial loss of profits for
America's biggest companies would not bode well for the U.S.
economy, considering the jobs and national revenue that would be
lost.'73
3. Benefits to Cuba
Not only could non-recognition of U.S. trademarks in Cuba
hurt consumers and businesses, it could actually benefit Cuba and
the Castro regime. 74 The Cuban companies established to market
goods under the names of U.S. trademarks would bring in a
portion of the profits that U.S. companies would lose. 175 The
The U.S. pharmaceutical industry alone estimates annual losses of $2 billion
from counterfeits. Aoki, supra note 154.
171 Goodwill is essentially the advantage of a business having a good reputation and
regular patronage. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 703 (7th ed. 1999).
172 SODIPO, supra note 160, at 81. At the very least, consumers who buy counterfeit
goods of inferior quality, thinking that they are made by a well-known company, will
blame that company when the inferior quality of the goods comes to light. The AntiCounterfeiting Group, supra note 150.
173 The U.S. Customs Service estimated in 1993 that 750,000 American jobs were
lost because of counterfeiting. Toby Roth, Fight Modern-Day Global Pirates, J.OF
COM., Oct. 24, 1996., at 7A. With respect to revenue, it was estimated in 1994 that New
York City alone lost $350 million in tax revenue to counterfeiting. Lawrence Van
Gelder, 6 Are Accused of Violating TrademarkLaws, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1996, at B5.
174 See Mimi Whitefield, Cuba Threatens to Produce Its Own Bacardi Rum, THE
MIAMI HERALD, March 20, 2001, at IA, DIALOG, File No. 11079007.
175 See SODIPO, supra note 160, at 150. Castro is well aware of the potential
benefits Cuba could reap from producing its own versions of American products and
marketing them under the American trademarks. In one speech where he discussed
Cuba's response to the Havana Club dispute, Castro said, "We'll be able to benefit from
the millions [of dollars] that have been spent [on advertising] some products because it's
very easy to produce them. Here we can produce Palmolive, any toothpaste ......
Whitefield, supra note 174 (alterations in original).
170
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establishment of these companies would also create jobs.'76
Finally, the strengthening of the Cuban economy alone would
fortify the Castro regime.'77
B. The InternationalResponse
Despite what seems to be a victory for the United States in the
WTO dispute settlement process, Section 211 is still seen by many
as a violation of the fundamental principles of TRIPS.' 78 From the
viewpoint of Section 211's opponents, the very country that has
been such a strong advocate for intellectual property rights
protection is contradicting itself.'
This means that continued
adherence to Section 211 could result in an acute loss of
legitimacy and credibility for the United States. A loss of
legitimacy and credibility could negatively affect the
harmonization movement and the U.S. economy, while benefiting
the Castro regime.
1. Effect on the HarmonizationMovement and the U.S.
Economy
Because of the United States's activism with respect to the
implementation and enforcement of international intellectual
property protection, it has widely been viewed as a leader in the
area. 180 As a leader, many countries look to the United States to
set the standard. These countries could see Section 211 as an
indication that the protection of intellectual property rights is
necessary-except when it doesn't suit their purpose. This
response could impede, and perhaps reverse, progress in terms of
176 See SODIPO, supra note 160, at 150.
177 A strong economy tends to keep citizens happy with their leaders, even when the
leader is otherwise embroiled in controversy. See Arthur Laffer, Tax Cuts, Then and
Now, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 2001, at WL 24138238 (published as a web exclusive).
178 The EU in itself is a formidable opponent; plus, there is considerable
disagreement within the United States as to the wisdom of Section 211. For example,
the Center for International Policy held a conference in June 2001 that was highly critical
of Section 211. See Landau & Smith, supra note 16.
179 See id.

180 Macaw, supra note 4, at 329-330. The United States was a key player in urging
the WTO to adopt more stringent intellectual property protections, and it frequently uses
the WTO dispute settlement procedures to enforce its intellectual property rights in other
countries. Id.
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harmonizing international intellectual property protection. The
danger is even more evident in the context of developing
countries, which have even less incentive to protect the intellectual
property of developed nations."'
2. The U.S. Economy
As fewer countries value international intellectual property
protection, the U.S. economy will have more problems.
Moreover, the danger of counterfeited goods is not the only
problem the U.S. economy could experience if Section 211 is
enforced. The U.S. stands to lose foreign investments as it loses
credibility and legitimacy. Countries that look down upon U.S.
foreign policy could choose to take their investments elsewhere
such as to countries that have chosen to abide by obligations to
other nations, even when it does not suit them. 8 2 At the very least,
foreign investors will be wary of investing in the United States
because of uncertainty as to whether the United States will
continue to recognize their intellectual property rights.' 83
3. Castro'sRegime
The benefit from the non-recognition of U.S. trademarks is not
the only benefit the Castro regime could reap from the continued
application of Section 211. Indeed, Section 211 is helping Castro
bond with the Cuban citizens. Section 211 combined with the
United States's stance toward Cuba becomes a tie that binds for
Cubans. Like the Cuban embargo in general, the Castro regime
has reached "quasi-martyr status by permitting its 8subjects
to focus
4
States."'
United
the
namely
enemy,
external
an
on

Id. at 323. As much of an impact as intellectual property law can have on the
development of a country, enforcing the intellectual property rights of another country is
often seen by developing countries as a burden on development. Developing countries
also see the importation of intellectual property as a means of control and exploitation on
the part of the developed countries. Id. at 323-24.
182 See Use andEffect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Trade of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 8-13 (1999) (statement of
Willard A. Workman, Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
183 See SODIPO, supra note 160, at 81.
181

184

Statement of Willard A. Workman, supra note 182.
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V. Conclusion
It may be that none of the consequences discussed in Section
IV will happen. The United States could revise Section 211 to
conform to its international treaty obligations, and the other WTO
members could learn to accept it. The problem is the risk. The
protection of U.S. intellectual property rights in foreign markets is
too important to risk, especially considering that the justifications
of Section 211 are so weak.
On the one hand, Section 211 is justified as a means of
furthering the interests of the Cuban embargo.'85 The Cuban
embargo, however, is quickly losing support, both internationally
and in the United States. Representing the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, Willard Workman berated the United States for this
policy'86 and pointed out the opposition that other nations have for
the embargo.' 87 Even Pope John Paul II has spoken out against the
Cuban embargo on humanitarian grounds.'88
Given the
diminishing global support for the embargo, this rationale does not
seem to justify risking the protection of U.S. intellectual property
rights abroad.
In addition, Section 211 may actually run counter to the
interests of the Cuban embargo. Arguably, the underlying purpose
of the embargo is to weaken the Castro regime.'89 However, the
continued application of Section 211 could strengthen, rather than

185 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
186 Statement of Willard A. Workman, supra note 182. It is estimated that unilateral
sanctions such as the Cuban embargo cost the American economy between $15 and $20
billion a year. Further, the embargo is a sign of American hypocrisy: The United States
claims that one of the rationales for the embargo is to discourage the human rights
violations imposed by Castro, but the United States does not maintain such harsh
sanctions against much more objectionable regimes, such as that of North Korea. See id.
187 Id. Some Canadian and European governments passed laws prohibiting citizens
from complying with laws imposing sanctions on Cuba. Id.
188 Id. The Pope objects to the sanctions on human rights grounds, stating that the
sanctions only serve to hurt the weakest members of the population in denying them
necessities such as medicine. See BBC News, Pope Picks U.S. Embargo as Final
Target, (Jan. 26, 1998), availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/50516.stm.
189 See Sen. Jesse Helms, Tighten the Screws: The Chairman of Senate Foreign
Relations Committee Says Now is Not the Time to Ease Up on Cuba,
CIGAR AFICIONADO, May-June 1999 at 80, available at http://www.cigaraficionado.com/
Cigar/Aficionado/Archives/199906/fb699.html.
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weaken, Castro's regime.19 °
The other justification for Section 211 is to discourage the
illegal expropriation of private property. 9 ' Theoretically, this is a
valid consideration.
A government taking private property
without compensation is impermissible. Realistically, however, it
is doubtful that Section 211 will have the desired effect. The
United States has a long history of imposing sanctions on
countries as an attempt to deter objectionable conduct, but the
success rate of actually getting these countries to change their
behavior is poor at best.'92 One need only look at the effect, or
lack thereof, of sanctions imposed by the United States to deter
India and Pakistan from a nuclear arms race.' 93 Overall, the
possibility that Section 211 will actually affect a nation's decision
to engage in illegal expropriation of property is far outweighed by
the risk Section 211 poses of losing international intellectual
property protection.
In conclusion, the continued application of Section 211 creates
unacceptable risks to the United States and consumers worldwide.
The possible consequences run counter to the goals of TRIPS by
opening the door to undesirable ramifications for consumers and
international relations. Further, applying Section 211 could have
unwelcome effects on the U.S. economy, which was arguably the
entire reason the United States was in the forefront of the push for
international harmony in protecting intellectual property rights.
Considering the weakness of the justifications for further
application of Section 211, the conclusion must be drawn that
Section 211 poses too many risks to the international protection of
U.S. intellectual property.
ASHLEY

C. ADAMS

190 See supra notes 175-78, 184 and accompanying text.
191 Supra note 67 and accompanying text.
192 Statement of Willard A. Workman, supra note 182.
193 See id. Despite the sanctions the United States imposed on India and Pakistan,
the two countries are "at their highest military buildup in 15 years." Kathleen Kenna,
Manley Urges India to Lead Peace Bid, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 22, 2002, at A1.

